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Abstract
Online template attack (OTA) is a powerful technique pre-
viously used to attack elliptic curve scalar multiplication al-
gorithms. This attack has been only analyzed in the realm
of power-consumption and EM side-channels, where the sig-
nals leak about the value to be processed. However, no mi-
croarchitecture analysis variant has been proposed, especially
considering the different nature between power-consumption
signals and microarchitecture-based ones.
In this paper we start filling this gap by revisiting the orig-
inal OTA description, proposing a generic framework and
evaluation metrics for any side-channel signal. Our analy-
sis reveals OTA features not covered before, increasing its
application scenarios that requires revisiting original coun-
termeasures to prevent it. In this regard we demonstrate that
OTA can work in the backward direction allowing to mount
an augmented projective coordinates attack wrt the proposed
by Naccache et al. (Eurocrypt 2004).
We analyze three libraries libgcrypt, mbedTLS, and
wolfSSL using two microarchitecture side-channels. For the
libgcrypt case we target its EdDSA implementation us-
ing Curve25519 twist curve. We obtain similar results for
mbedTLS and wolfSSL with curve secp256r1. For each li-
brary we execute extensive attack instances being able to
recover the complete scalar in all cases using a single trace.
In this work demonstrate that microarchitecture online tem-
plate attacks are also very powerful in this scenario, recover-
ing secret information without knowing a leakage model. This
highlights the importance of developing secure-by-default im-
plementations, instead of fix-on-demand ones.
1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks are a common threat to computing plat-
forms nowadays. Since the pioneering works of Kocher [26]
several kinds of leaky channels have been discovered, for
instance, execution time, power consumption, and in the mi-
croarchitecture realm cache-timings, sequence of page ac-
cesses, just to mention a few [26, 27, 38, 51, 52].
Several techniques have been proposed to exploits said
channels, among them template attacks assumes the adver-
sary can profile the targeted implementation side-channel
signals [30]. Chari et al. [11] introduced template attacks in
the context of power consumption side-channel, consisting in
three phases: (i) templates building, (ii) target trace capture,
and (iii) template matching. The template building phase is
performed on an attacker-controlled implementation very sim-
ilar to the targeted one. During this phase the attacker profiles
leakage by building leakage templates.
Note that this attack description by Chari et al. [11] consid-
ered templates built before capturing the target trace. Later,
Medwed and Oswald [32] challenged this order, with template
attacks targeting ECDSA scalar multiplication. The authors
analyzed several scenarios related to this order, proposing an
on-the-fly template building [32, Sect. 5.3]. That is, creating
templates after capturing the target trace.
Related to this template attack phases order, Batina et al.
[5] proposed what is known in literature as Online Template
Attacks (OTA), also building the templates after capturing the
target trace similar to [32]. The main differences between [32]
and [5] relies on how the templates are constructed. Medwed
and Oswald [32] used “vertical” power consumption leakage
while Batina et al. [5] used “horizontal” leakage (see [13] for
definitions). However, despite this difference both approaches
agree on the moment when templates are built and template
attacks that follow this approach are labeled as OTA.
Creating template traces in advance is feasible when the
number of possible templates to create is small. For instance,
a binary exponentiation algorithm where templates are used
to distinguish a single branch result only requires two tem-
plates [11]. However, when the number of leaking features
to detect is large, e.g. coordinates of an elliptic curve point,
the number of different templates could be infeasible to gen-
erate in advance. This scenario is where OTA enters into play
by capturing templates on-demand/online based on a secret
guess [5].
Originally, OTA was proposed and applied in several works
using power consumption/EM side-channels. Dugardin et al.
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[18] demonstrated a practical OTA attack on PolarSSL scalar
multiplication using EM signals. Regarding power signals,
Sandmann [41] targeted FourQ scalar multiplication and
Roelofs [40] instead ECDSA.
Luo [28] used the OTA approach, but generated template
traces using a leakage model instead of being captured on
a similar device. This approach does not require a template
device but it requires a leakage model, but nevertheless adds
attack flexibility wrt the original description [5].
Bos et al. [9] analyzed the feasibility of OTA on Frodo post-
quantum proposal. The authors employed a power consump-
tion trace emulator for modeling both attack and template
traces instead of real devices [31]. It would be interesting
to study attack feasibility using such an emulator to gather
template traces while the target trace belongs to a real device.
One common property in these works is they use starting
algorithm state (e.g. initial elliptic curve point coordinates)
as attack input. This trend is likely motivated by the fact
that OTA was originally presented in this setting, where the
starting value of an accumulator is known to the attacker
[5]. However, in this paper we challenge this assumption and
show it is not an attack requirement, considerably expanding
its applications.
Regarding microarchitecture side-channel attacks, several
template attacks have been proposed in literature [2, 7, 10,
12, 17, 20, 50]. Brumley and Hakala [10] developed data
cache-timing template to attack ECDSA scalar multiplication
using PRIME+PROBE, while Acıiçmez et al. [2] extended the
concept to the L1 instruction cache. Similarly Gruss et al.
[20] showed the feasibility to construct templates from Last
Level Cache using FLUSH+RELOAD to attack AES T-Box im-
plementations. Bhattacharya et al. [7] constructed templates
from performance counters related to the branch prediction
unit (BPU) to attack elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
However, regardless of exploited microarchitecture com-
ponents and applications, all these works follow the original
template attack approach by Chari et al. [11], where templates
are built before capturing the target trace. Based on extensive
literature review, it seems microarchitecture-based OTA re-
lated works are a research gap. Therefore, it is unknown how
OTA applies in the microarchitecture realm, especially con-
sidering that OTA original description motivates with power
consumption side-channel signals that leak differently from
microarchitecture ones due to their different natures. There-
fore original OTA implicitly assumes information on the side-
channel signals that might not be present in microarchitecture
based ones.
In this paper, we start to fill this gap, not only demonstrating
OTA effectiveness on commonly used libraries, but revisiting
original OTA description demonstrating it is more flexible
than previously believed leading to new application scenarios
regardless of the exploited side-channel.
Section 2 presents background on elliptic curve scalar mul-
tiplication algorithms and microarchitecture side-channels.
Section 3 revisits the original OTA description, proposing a
generic framework for its analysis. Section 4 analyzes OTA
countermeasures considering its previous description and the
proposed one. Later, Section 5 instantiates the proposed OTA
framework in the microarchitecture realm, evaluating this
attack in three software libraries. Section 6 presents full end-
to-end OTA attack experiments on these libraries, capable of
recovering the secret in all instances using a single trace. We
present conclusions in Section 7.
Our main contributions are as follows: (i) revisiting OTA,
revealing properties, application scenarios, and evaluation
metrics not considered before; (ii) first microarchitecture OTA
analysis; (iii) proposing an augmented projective coordinates
attack that reduces the number of required traces from thou-
sands to one, wrt the original attack of Naccache et al. [34];
(iv) developing a tool to detect OTA based leakages in soft-
ware libraries using different attack vectors; (v) practical mi-
croarchitecture OTA attacks on three widely used software
libraries.
2 Background
2.1 Elliptic curve scalar multiplication
Scalar multiplication is one of the main operations in ECC. It
computes P = kG for a scalar k and an elliptic curve point G,
equivalent to aggregate k times G with itself. Regarding non-
quantum elliptic curve cryptosystems, this operation plays a
crucial role because inverting it (i.e. recovering k knowing P
and G) requires solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (ECDLP) considered hard for well-chosen elliptic
curves [21].
On the other hand, scalar multiplication is the most time-
consuming operation in these cryptosystems. Among the sev-
eral approaches to implement it, performance was initially
the main goal. But after the groundbreaking work on side-
channel analysis of Kocher [26] in 1996, resistance against
these attacks is considered a must.
Several approaches exist for computing a scalar multipli-
cation, for instance: double-and-add, Montgomery ladder,
window-based methods, etc. [21, 22, 24, 25]. Regardless of
their differences, all of them share the property that at every
iteration a state is updated based on secret data. A state can be
a single elliptic curve point accumulator (e.g. double-and-add)
or a set of them (e.g. Montgomery ladder). This property of
scalar multiplication algorithms and the state concept play a
crucial role in the OTA analysis presented in Section 3. In this
section we define an abstract scalar multiplication description
(Algorithm 1) to represent all of them as it fits better for a
generic OTA description. Later during the real-world OTA at-
tacks in Section 6 we instantiate this algorithm using concrete
implementations.
Algorithm 1 consists of four generic operations:
Encode: This operation encodes the scalar k in a list K =
2
Algorithm 1: Generic scalar multiplication
Input: Integer k and curve generator G
Output: P = kG
1 K = Encode(k)
2 S0 = Init(G)
3 for Ki ∈ K do
4 Si = Select(Si−1,Ki)
5 Si+1 = Process(Si)
6 P = Finalize(S|K|+1)
7 return P
{K1,K2, . . ,Kn}, where at every algorithm iteration at least
one of element of K will be processed. For instance, in the
double-and-add algorithm K is the binary representation of k.
The encoding defines how many possibilities exist for each Ki.
The only requirement for this step is that it can be inverted,
i.e. it is possible to recover k from K.
Init: This operation initializes the first state S0 using the
point G, as well as performs coordinate conversion and pre-
computation.
Select: This operation defines the current state Si based
on Ki and the previous state. We assume that the implementa-
tion of this operation does not trivially leak Ki. This is a com-
mon assumption for scalar multiplication algorithms protected
against trivial attacks (e.g. balanced Ki-related branches).
Process: This is the most important operation regarding
this research. This step processes the current state Si generat-
ing the next state, executing the required elliptic curve point
doubling and addition according to the curve/coordinates for-
mulae. OTA aims at identifying which Si was processed at
each iteration leading to the selected Ki in the previous state.
The adversary has freedom to select the Process operation,
for instance, it can be composed by all point operations in
the curve formulae, or only a subset of them. Additionally,
the position of Select wrt to Process could vary between
implementations and selected Process, however adapting the
attack to these cases is trivial.
Finalize: This operation processes the last state S|K|+1
just before returning the output point P. For instance, projec-
tive to affine coordinates conversion is usually executed at
this point [21, 34].
In addition to the scalar multiplication algorithm, there
exist several point coordinate representations that define the
formulae employed for computing point doubling and addi-
tion on a given elliptic curve [21]. Regardless of the selected
coordinate system, these operations usually require several
modular computations (i.e. additions, multiplications, divi-
sion, etc.) performed on multiprecision integers (bignum).
Therefore an ECC implementation consists of several lay-
ers, and eliminating side-channel leakages in all of them is a
challenging task.
2.2 Microarchitecture side-channels
Several microarchitecture based side-channels have been dis-
covered, where execution time, cache-timing and port con-
tention are a few examples [3, 19, 26, 38, 52]. However de-
spite technique details almost all of them aim at exploiting
address-based information leakage [1, 19, 43, 49]. That is, a
leak produced by secret-dependent memory accesses. When
said dependency produces different execution paths, it is la-
beled as control-flow leakage, whereas a data leak exists if a
data-memory access is secret-dependent [49].
Another kind of leakage that can exist in a computing plat-
form is a value based leakage. For instance, some CMOS
devices leak the Hamming weight of the processed values
through their power consumption [27, 39]. However microar-
chitecture side-channels that exploit value-based leakages are
not common at all [14, 19, 43].
This difference between power and microarchitecture-
based side-channels challenges the application of OTA in
the microarchitecture realm because OTA original descrip-
tion inherently assumes that value-based leakage exists in the
exploited channel [5].
The constant-time feature is often used to label a soft-
ware implementation as side-channel secure. However, re-
garding address-based leakages, a more accurate term could
be constant-address implementation [19]. Therefore, we use
the term constant-time consistent with the common trend in
the literature, but referring to the latter.
OTA highlights the need to develop constant-time imple-
mentations. Side-channel secured scalar multiplication algo-
rithms remove secret dependent branches at its highest level.
However, is it the only layer that needs to be constant-time?
In this regard, it is common that lowest bignum arithmetic in-
deed contains branches, especially when the implementation
was inherited from code developed when side-channel leak-
ages were not a concern. For instance, OpenSSL, libgcrypt,
mbedTLS, wolfSSL are open-source libraries with this prop-
erty1.
Address-based memory leakages could exist at different
granularities and several microarchitecture side-channels have
been developed to exploit them. The zoo of available attacks
is diverse with different properties like threat model, granu-
larity, targeted information, noise-level, etc. The next section
presents a generic OTA framework that aims to be applicable
to any side-channel, and later in Section 5 we analyze three
libraries employing two microarchitecture ones.
3 Online Template Attacks: Revisited
This section revisits OTA description, proposing a new frame-
work for its analysis and evaluation, demonstrating some
features not considered before. For this analysis we use the
1OpenSSL and wolfSSL are transitioning their bignum arithmetic to
provide constant-time security at all layers.
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generic scalar multiplication (Algorithm 1) described in Sec-
tion 2.
Abstractly, OTA procedure consists of the following steps.
We discuss differences regarding the original proposal in the
following sections.
1. Capture one side-channel trace T while the targeted im-
plementation processes some secret k.
2. Split the target trace in iterations, T = {I1, I2, . . , In}.
Where each Ii corresponds to the processing of state Si
according to Ki. Therefore, it is expected Ii corresponds
to the Process operation in Algorithm 1.
3. Extend: Enumerate every possible Ki and according to
the Select operation compute every possible Si using
the previous state. Capture traces corresponding to the
Process operation while processing each computed Si.
This produces a template trace Ti, j for every possible Ki
represented by j.
4. Prune: Filter-out those Ti, j that do not match Ii.
5. For all Ti, j surviving the pruning phase, repeat for the
next iteration from step 3, backtracking if multiple
matches are found.
6. Terminate: finish the attack after recovering sufficient
Ki.
This algorithm follows an extend-and-prune approach,
where step 3 extends the number of candidates and step 4
prunes unlikely ones. OTA idea is to identify which state Si
was processed at an iteration and derive Ki from it.
Extend: This step can be performed using different ap-
proaches related to how much control the adversary has over
the template implementation. For instance, which input does
it accept? can the adversary modify it?
In this regard, the ideal scenario takes place when the at-
tacker has access to a template implementation where she
can obtain traces of the Process operation for any state Si.
However, in practice sometimes it is not available due to API
limitations. For instance, in embedded systems it is not com-
mon that a device exports an API for the Process operation
alone, but a high level one for the scalar multiplication, or
even worse, a protocol one (e.g. ECDSA signature genera-
tion/verification). In addition, even if the Process API is
available, the state representation may differ from the targeted
one. For more details on techniques in each scenario, consult
[5, 32, 37, 40].
These limited scenarios are more likely on embedded sys-
tems, in constrast to the microarchitecture realm. For instance,
a common threat model is the adversary and victim share the
same computing platform, attacking a shared cryptography
library (e.g. cache attacks). In this scenario the attacker can
use the shared library binary, or if it is open-source she can
construct a fork with a more flexible API. In our practical
experiments in Section 6 we explore this path, showing this
OTA flexibility in the microarchitecture realm.
Prune: This phase controls the search tree growth based on
a match score. The signal nature determines the method em-
ployed to assess if a template trace matches the targeted one.
Pearson correlation coefficient has been used in power con-
sumption OTAs [5, 18, 40], whereas Ozgen et al. [36] ex-
plored other classification algorithms. Regardless of the em-
ployed approach, this step should minimize the probability of
pruning the good candidate, while maximizing the probability
of pruning incorrect ones.
In this paper we only consider algorithms that does not
prune the correct solution (i.e. Pr[false negative] = 0). Deal-
ing with “false negatives” requires a highly application de-
pendent error correction procedure. For instance, if multiple
copies of the target trace can be captured, this redundancy can
help to thwart errors, however not all cryptosystems allow this.
We leave the analysis of OTA combined with error-correction
approaches for future work.
Terminate: Algorithm termination depends on the attacked
cryptosystem and certainty about the recovered data. Some
cryptosystems like ECDSA break when knowing (with cer-
tainty) a small number of bits of the scalars used to generate
a set of signatures [23, 35]. Therefore, if sufficient Ki are re-
liably recovered such that the number of bits of k that they
reveal are sufficient to apply said cryptanalysis, there is no
need to recover the full scalar [18].
On the other hand, some cryptosystems like Edwards-curve
DSA-variant (EdDSA) are designed to prevent such cryptanal-
ysis [6]. For this scenario OTA should recover sufficient bits
such that solving the ECDLP is feasible, where naturally re-
covering the full scalar is also an option.
Partial scalar recovery using OTA ideally requires a side-
channel that allows recovering each Ki with absolute certainty.
Otherwise, it increases the number of iterations to process
expecting that the pruning removes the incorrect ones [18]. If
a full scalar recovery is desired, the attacker can implement it
using depth-first search, considering that the correct solution
will survive every pruning step and it is more likely that in-
correct ones do not. However, if the pruning phase produces
many false positives the attacker should test each solution
produced by the algorithm until finding the correct one.
3.1 Attack input and direction
OTA was presented as a chosen-input attack [5]. However, it
is worth highlighting that this requirement is about the tem-
plate implementation, not the targeted one. This distinction is
important because it is considered in OTA literature that the
attacker needs to know the input point to determine the initial
state S0 and subsequent ones [5, 18, 28, 31, 32, 40].
We revisit this claim discovering that it is not a strict attack
requirement. Instead we propose the following: OTA applies
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if the adversary knows that a state processed by the target
implementation belongs to a known set of states with feasible
enumeration. Note additionally that it is a sufficient condition,
not a necessary one (Section 3.2 expands).
The initial state S0 case is covered by previous works. More-
over, the OTA description given above also applies if the ad-
versary knows any Si and starts the attack there. Such state
could be obtained by a complementary side-channel attack.
We have not found an implementation or previous works with
such a leakage that allows recovering an intermediate state,
however the last state case (S|K|+1 in Algorithm 1) requires
more attention.
Knowing the last state might seem harmless regarding
OTA previous work because it recovers the Ki reproduc-
ing the targeted algorithm execution (i.e. forward direction).
Hence, no state is processed after computing the last state
(cf. Algorithm 1). However, we challenge this claim by an-
swering this question: could OTA be executed in the backward
direction?
Following the OTA description given above, if the adver-
sary knows the last state Sn she can compute Sn−1 inverting
the Process operation. Depending on the curve formulae,
this inversion often involves computing modular roots, pos-
sibly obtaining more than one candidate for Sn−1 [34]. Then
the adversary can capture template traces for every computed
Sn−1 and prune those not matching the observed iteration
trace In. This will allow determining the processed state and
eventually the corresponding Ki. Repeating this process for
previous iterations could allow recovering all Ki.
This demonstrates OTA can be applied in the backward
sense, reversing the order of T = {I1, I2, . . , In} in step 2 and
using the last computed state S|K|+1 as the attack starting
state and obtaining the previous one from it. This variant
could be harder to solve, because each guess for Ki might
generate more than one candidate due to the modular roots,
thus increasing the number of candidates per iteration and
the pruning phase must filter out more candidates. Section 6
demonstrates this attack in two different scenarios recovering
the scalar using a single trace, showing feasibility in practice.
Very related to this idea is the projective coordinates at-
tack proposed by Naccache et al. [34], that demonstrated the
projective representation of the scalar multiplication output
point could reveal information about the scalar. The approach
is purely algebraic and relies on—when inverting Process
based on a guess about Ki—no modular roots existing, con-
cluding that said Ki is incorrect. However, due to modular
roots properties the search tree explodes very quickly, there-
fore the number of bits that can be recovered is small [4, 34].
This attack requires knowing the projective coordinates
of the output point (e.g. last state). This can be obtained for
instance using a complementary attack: Maimut et al. [29]
used a fault-injection attack while Aldaya et al. [4] used a
microarchitecture side-channel. Therefore, executing OTA in
the backward direction could allow recovering all bits of the
scalar using a single trace, therefore a backward OTA can be
considered as an augmented projective coordinates attack.
Note that in addition to the contribution wrt the work of
Naccache et al. [34] this attack also demonstrates that OTA
can be applied in the backward direction whereas previous
works only considered the forward case.
3.2 Revisited OTA requirements
In this section we revisit original OTA requirements, allowing
to determine if a scenario could be targeted by an OTA. Evi-
dently, this does not imply the attack will succeed, but allows
developers to know if their implementation should take OTA
into account. We define the following OTA requirements:
Distinguisher: A leak of the implementation of Process
can be used as state distinguisher.
Reproducible: The adversary has access to a template
implementation that will process the same data as the
target implementation for the same input.
The Distinguisher requirement has been assumed in pre-
vious works due to power-consumption side-channel proper-
ties. Power-consumption signals leak about the values being
processed, therefore this requirement only depends on the
signal-to-noise ratio. However, in the microarchitecture realm,
value-based leakages are not common, therefore the attacker
should rely on address-based leakage (e.g. non constant-time
code). Section 3.3 discusses this requirement and proposes
some metrics to evaluate how well an implementation leak of
Process can be used as state distinguisher.
Regarding the Reproducible requirement, depending on
which input the template implementation accepts, the attack
could be either state- or scalar-based.
State-based: Previous works on OTA assume that an attacker
knows the first state. In Section 3.1 we extended this to any
state in both forward and backward directions. This scenario
can be generalized even further to the case no state is known,
but the attacker knows a set of states where one of them is the
correct one. Intuitively, if said set can be feasibly enumerated,
the adversary can perform the attack for every state in it.
Scalar-based: If the template implementation allows execut-
ing the same scalar multiplication algorithm as the target one,
the adversary can guess the first processed Ki. For instance,
when using a binary algorithm where each Ki represents the
ith bit of k, the attacker can use the template implementation
to capture the traces for [0]G and [1]G and then compare with
the target one: if only one matches the target trace, the at-
tacker learns a bit of k. The next iteration builds templates
using previous learned information on k. In this scenario the
attacker does not require a known state, but expects that one
of the states processed in template traces corresponds to the
target one, i.e. the adversary can reproduce the target imple-
mentation execution.
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The scalar-based approach only works in the forward di-
rection because the processed states depend on previous ones.
During our experiments we use both approaches to recover
the scalar. As mentioned before, the fulfillment of these re-
quirements does not guarantee attack success: the next section
proposes some metrics to evaluate an implementation regard-
ing OTA.
3.3 Evaluation metrics
Original OTA paper claims that OTA could recover a full
scalar employing one template trace per key bit [5]. However,
this claim only holds when targeting a binary scalar multipli-
cation algorithm (Ki is a binary value) and if the distributions
for the matching scores for correct and incorrect templates
are well-separated.
Therefore OTA performance depends on the side-channel
exploited, its characteristics such as signal-to-noise ratio, error
resilience, etc. Previous works on OTA only consider power-
related side-channels, making assumptions about the signal
that may not hold for other side-channels like microarchitec-
ture based ones.
Following the generic scalar multiplication Algorithm 1, we
represent an implementation of Process operation using (1),
where Li is a side-channel trace resulting from its execution
with Si as input.
Process(Si) Li (1)
Note Li is equivalent to template traces notation Ti, j. How-
ever, for the sake of notation simplicity we rename it as Li
as it fits better the following analysis where its Ki relation is
meaningless.
The objective of each OTA iteration is to detect which tem-
plate trace matches with the target one. Therefore, intuitively
the better Li represents a state Si the better the attack will
perform.
The ideal attacker scenario happens when for every Si there
is one and only one Li and viceversa (i.e. bijective sets). This
implies leakage determinism, that is, every time Si is pro-
cessed the same Li will be observed. On the other hand, if
the set formed by all possible Li only has one element, it
is not possible to distinguish any Si using Li. Therefore an
implementation with this feature can be considered OTA-safe.
Regarding power consumption side-channel, ideal and safe
scenarios are not common due to channel characteristics.
Power consumption signals contain random noise therefore
the ideal scenario can only be achieved if this noise is removed
completely, which is usually not possible in practice [28, 30].
At the same time, a safe scenario (as defined before) is chal-
lenging to achieve because power signals inherently contain
value-related leaks (Section 2), and preventing those requires
specific hardware design [30]. Therefore, generally speaking,
two different states will inherently generate different signals.
Hence, a power side-channel OTA adversary usually handles
scenarios that lay between these boundary cases. On the other
hand, value-based side-channel leakages are not common in
the microarchitecture realm. Therefore, both ideal and safe
scenarios can occur in this context, taking advantage of the
benefits of the latter and suffering the curse of the former (see
countermeasure analysis in Section 4).
We propose some metrics and a flow to measure them
that allows a security auditor or an attacker to evaluate if an
implementation could be vulnerable to OTA. Figure 1 shows
a flow diagram to guide the evaluation process.
Deterministic?
pmf(L) = ? @ N
card?
bias?
hard easy
safe ideal
Pr[FN] = ?
handle
errors
Pr[FP] = ?
hard easy
yes
(1,N)
high low
1 N
no
/0 0
high low
Figure 1: OTA evaluation flow (attacker perspective).
The first step is to estimate if the targeted implementation is
deterministic taking into account the considered side-channels
in the threat model. Determinism can be estimated by captur-
ing a set of traces with identical inputs and comparing them.
Ideally this should be done over the entire scalar multipli-
cation algorithm, to detect which algorithm operations have
deterministic behavior. For instance, non-determinism during
the Init operation is good evidence there is a state random-
ization countermeasure in place [15], while deterministic Init
and Process could be dangerous. Naturally, if the attacker will
exploit a noisy side-channel non-determinism is implicit.
A deterministic Process implies that the Reproducible
requirement is fulfilled, otherwise the template matching al-
gorithm performance should be considered. For this task, we
propose to estimate the probability that said algorithm pro-
duces false negatives. As discussed previously if it is not zero,
the attacker must deal with errors in the recovery process. On
the other hand if Pr[FN] = 0 the evaluator knows the solution
will remain in the tree. Therefore, in this case the leakage of
Process could be reproduced somehow.
The last metric for the non-deterministic case allows to
determine the Distinguisher requirement. For this purpose the
false positive probability can be estimated, i.e. probability that
the matching algorithm incorrectly classifies a template trace
as a match. This probability defines the number of branches
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of the solution tree, therefore the lower this value the closer
to the ideal attacker scenario and viceversa. How many false
positives the attack can handle depends on the computing
resources available to the adversary.
The right branch of Figure 1 is likely to occur in power-
consumption side-channels. Previous OTA works developed
attacks with Pr[FN] = 0 and low Pr[FP] [5, 18]. In general
this branch fits better for noisy side-channels. The left branch
of this evaluation flow covers the case where determinism
is observed in the targeted implementation using a particu-
lar side-channel. Therefore, the Reproducible requirement is
perfectly fulfilled in this scenario.
In a deterministic scenario, it is possible to evaluate how
well a side-channel trace of Process can be used as a state
Distinguisher. For this task, we propose to estimate the proba-
bility mass function of the leakages produced by the Process
operation (Li in (1)). We denote this set as L.
The number of possible states is huge: obtaining an Li
for each of them is unfeasible. Therefore, we estimate the
pm f (L) using several (N) randomly generated Si, allowing
an estimate of the cardinality of L (i.e. number of different
outcomes), and how biased its distribution is.
Intuitively, the greater the cardinality of L the better an Li
can be used to distinguish the processed Si. Figure 1 shows the
conclusions drawn with this estimation. If the cardinality is
one, it means every analyzed state produced the same leakage,
therefore, a state cannot be distinguished using the employed
side-channel: the implementation can be considered OTA-
safe. On the contrary, if the number of observed leakages is
equal to the number of states used for the estimation (N), it
implies an ideal attacker scenario because it is very likely the
adversary can use the exploited side-channel as a perfect state
distinguisher.
On the other hand if the cardinality is between these corner
cases, the distribution bias will determine the computing effort
in finding the solution. If pm f (L) is highly biased towards
one outcome (Li) the number of false positives will increase,
and the search tree grows accordingly. On the other hand, if no
such high bias exists then solving the problem is easy. What
is considered a high bias depends on attacker computation
resources. During our experiments (detailed later) we recover
full 256-bit scalars with bias as high as 62%, using a desktop
workstation.
What could be considered a state Distinguisher? Suppose
a state consists of an elliptic curve point, then very deep
in the bignum implementation of the targeted implementa-
tion there is a conditional operation that produces two execu-
tion branches based on the evenness of the point coordinate
x. Therefore, wlog, assuming a random state, said control-
flow leak allows splitting the state space in two equiprobable
halves: such leakage can be used to distinguish if the pro-
cessed state contains an even x or not. This case will produce
an equiprobable pm f (L) with two outcomes, yet even this
tiny state distinguisher is sufficient to succeed using OTA
(see Section 6.3 for experiment results).
Note that during an OTA the adversary is not required
to known a model of the exploited leakage, i.e. how a deep
bignum control-flow leak relates to the processed secret. In-
stead the attacker blindly searches for distinguishable features
in the side-channel signals that fulfill OTA requirements. This
blind approach allows to evaluate state-dependent leakages
at any layer of the ECC implementation no matter how deep
they are in the hierarchy.
4 Mitigations analysis
To prevent OTA it should be sufficient to eliminate one of its
requirements in the implementation. For instance, if a call to
Process produces a random signal, it is not possible to repro-
duce the leakage produced by a given state. Projective coordi-
nates randomization of the starting state can be used for this
purpose as proposed in original OTA paper [5, 15]. However,
according to the analysis presented in Section 3.1 it should be
also applied after the scalar multiplication to prevent a back-
ward OTA (Section 6.2 demonstrates this countermeasure is
useless if only executed at the beginning). Furthermore, ide-
ally it should be applied to every state processed by Process
thus avoiding a potential intermediate-state based OTA.
Another line of defense is based in thwarting the Distin-
guisher requirement. That is, prevent a side-channel leak from
being used to distinguish the processed state. Note that this
mitigation was not considered in previous works because it
is not easy to achieve in the presence of value-based side-
channels like power consumption. However, in the microar-
chitecture realm, constant-address code should be sufficient
to meet this requirement. Naturally this countermeasure will
only be effective if it is applied to the entire implementation
stack.
5 Microarchitecture OTA
In this section we instantiate the OTA framework described
in Section 3 in the microarchitecture realm. In this context,
a leak can be divided in three groups based on its nature:
(i) executed control-flow, (ii) data accessed, and (iii) value
processed. Regarding microarchitecture side-channels the
most common leakages are produced by secret-dependent
memory accesses (first two cases), while value-based leakages
are less common (see Section 2).
Control-flow based leakages are observed when program
execution flow depends on secret data, e.g. due to a condi-
tional instruction result. While different side-channels could
be used to exploit such control-flow leakages, in this research
we focus our experiments on two approaches proved very
useful to target Intel SGX enclaves. This scenario is very
interesting because Intel SGX technology does not offers pro-
tections against side-channel attacks, delegating such defenses
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to developers [16]. Therefore, analyzing secured scalar multi-
plication implementations in open-source libraries regarding
OTA is interesting to assess their resilience to this attack.
Intel SGX aims at providing confidentiality and integrity
of software running in Intel microprocessors even if the OS
is under attacker control. Following Intel SGX threat model,
the controlled-channels attack proposed by Xu et al. [51]
provides access to the sequence of memory pages executed
by the victim enclave, a leakage source with 4 KB granularity
that can be used to track the enclave execution [42, 46, 47, 48].
This attack relies on Intel SGX which leaves control of its
memory pages to the untrusted OS. Therefore, an adversarial
OS can mark a memory page with SCA relevance as non-
executable and monitor it. A triggered page fault indicates the
execution of the monitored page [51]. Repeating the process
for a set of memory pages allows the adversary to track the
sequence of executed memory pages, thus potentially leaking
secret data processed by the enclave. This attack works at
4 KB granularity however it provides error free traces. For
the sake of simplicity, we refer to this page tracking attack as
PageTracer.
Recently, Moghimi et al. [33] proposed the CopyCat at-
tack that allows an adversary to glean the number of exe-
cuted instructions in a tracked memory page. While it also
works at page granularity it increase the information provided
by PageTracer. Both attacks can be carried out using the
SGX-Step framework proposed by Van Bulck et al. [45].
In this section we evaluate mbedTLS, libgcrypt, and
wolfSSL scalar multiplication implementations using the
OTA framework proposed in Section 3 regarding PageTracer
and CopyCat attacks. This evaluation, in addition to highlight-
ing their vulnerability to OTA, extensively compares both
attacks complementing the CopyCat research in [33].
Library selection was not arbitrary: we selected three open-
source libraries with multiprecision integer arithmetic not
designed to execute without input dependent execution flows.
This selection is interesting, because while these libraries put
significant effort in providing side-channel secure scalar multi-
plication, usually only the upper layer of this implementation
receives these security improvements, leaving the bignum
implementation unattended. The rationale behind this trend
is related to the fix-on-demand development process. At the
same time, analyzing how a conditional branch deep in the
bignum implementation relates to a secret only processed at
the highest layer is usually non-trivial, as it requires searching
for a leakage model which is not part of the library devel-
opment process. However, OTA can exploit a deep bignum
implementation leak without knowing its leakage model, high-
lighting the need of a secure-by-default implementation and
the analysis of the selected libraries regarding OTA.
In the next section, we analyze these libraries regarding
OTA, then in Section 6 we demonstrate full end-to-end attacks
on them.
5.1 Microarchitecture OTA evaluation tool
For evaluating OTA on software libraries using microarchi-
tecture side-channels we developed a tool that follows the
evaluation process shown in Figure 1.
We employed TracerGrind2, a binary dynamic instrumen-
tation tool developed as part of the Side-Channel Marvels
project of Bos et al. [8]. This tool patches Valgrind allowing
to record execution traces of a software binary. One of its
many features is the ability to track a specific address range,
allowing, for instance, focusing the analysis on a specific
shared-library.
The traces recorded with TracerGrind contain the se-
quence of accessed addresses (both data and code), therefore
it can be used to emulate a side-channel trace down to instruc-
tion granularity. For instance, CopyCat can be emulated using
TracerGrind by clearing the 12 least significant bits of every
executed memory address then run-length-encoding the re-
sulting trace. This produces a trace that contains the sequence
of executed memory pages and the number of instructions
executed within them. Similarly, a PageTracer trace can be
obtained by removing the instruction count information from
a CopyCat one. Naturally, other side-channel signals can be
obtained using this approach.
Later in Section 6 we empirically validate the accuracy
of TracerGrind regarding PageTracer, where it is used to
capture the template traces during real-world attack instances.
Regarding this evaluation, TracerGrind allows to emulate
a side-channel for the Process operation on each analyzed
library, allowing estimation of the metrics proposed in Sec-
tion 3.3.
Each library follows its own scalar multiplication approach,
therefore the definitions of state and Process varies.
5.2 pmf -based OTA simulator
In addition to the evaluation tool we also developed a pm f -
based attack simulator. This follows the same code base used
to attack real libraries (Section 6), however it abstracts the
template traces phase to speed up the analysis. This simulator
receives a pm f as input and models a 256-bit scalar multipli-
cation vulnerable to OTA with said pm f . Then our tooling
runs an OTA attack against this modeled implementation,
logging attack success or failure.
As analyzed in Section 3.3, easy and hard pm f classifi-
cation depends on adversary computational resources: we
used a rough threshold based on the pm f (L) bias. If the max-
imum outcome frequency of a pm f (L) is less than 70%, we
considered it as an easy target, otherwise a hard one.
Using this simulator and the above threshold, we experi-
mentally validated that the search tree during an OTA attack
2https://github.com/SideChannelMarvels/Tracer/tree/
master/TracerGrind
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for all easy pm f s in the analyzed libraries (i.e.≈ 276k in to-
tal) can be traversed until solution with modest computational
resources. Therefore we consider every easy pm f as insecure.
5.3 libgcrypt template implementation
Scalar multiplication in libgcrypt v1.8.5 follows the double-
and-add-always approach shown in Algorithm 2. It consists
of a main loop that iterates over every bit of k. At every itera-
tion a pair of doubling and addition operations are executed
regardless of the i-th bit of k. However, even if both operations
are executed, R is only updated with the result of the addition
operation if ki = 1. This is ensured by the conditional assign-
ment at line 5 that, when implemented securely, provides SCA
resistance to trivial attacks.
Algorithm 2: double-and-add always
Input: Integer k and elliptic curve point G
Output: P = kG
1 R = O
2 for i = blog2 kc downto 0 do
3 R = 2R
4 T = R+G
5 R = cond_assign(T,R,ki)
6 return R
Regarding our abstract scalar multiplication description, the
state in Algorithm 2 consists of a single elliptic curve point, R.
Similarly, the Process operation consists of a point doubling
and an addition. libgcrypt exports function wrappers for
these point operations on Weierstrass and Edwards curves:
gcry_mpi_ec_dup and gcry_mpi_ec_add respectively. This
allows the attacker to build a template implementation to exe-
cute both operations for every input point R, recording its trace
with TracerGrind. Regarding libgcrypt we focus our re-
search on EdDSA using a twisted Edwards curve birationally
equivalent to Curve25519 [6].
Following the evaluation flow in Figure 1 we evaluated
the Reproducible requirement, estimating if this implemen-
tation is deterministic. For this task, we generated a random
curve point and captured 10 independent traces using our tem-
plate implementation harness. Then, we repeated the experi-
ment for 1000 random points observing determinism in both
PageTracer and CopyCat traces in all cases. Therefore, it is
likely to reproduce the side-channel trace when processing
this implementation state R. Note that this test demonstrates a
fundamental difference between power-consumption signals
and the employed microarchitecture ones.
According to Figure 1 the next step for a deterministic sce-
nario is to estimate pm f (L). For this task we generated 1000
random points, recording their corresponding traces using
TracerGrind. This experiment resulted in 889 PageTracer
and 1000 CopyCat different traces. CopyCat results imply an
ideal attacker scenario whereas PageTracer results are close
to it. Both attack results allow concluding it is very likely a
leakage trace of libgcrypt doubling and addition implemen-
tation for Edwards curves can be used as state distinguisher
using any of these attacks.
We captured a first trace, observing that libgcrypt exe-
cuted code in 28 different memory pages for a single call to
doubling and addition wrappers for Edwards curves. We re-
peated the capture using TracerGrind but limiting the record-
ing to the address space of libgcrypt, hence external calls
are not recorded (e.g. libc ones). The number of executed
pages reduces to 17. An adversary can freely choose config-
uration because during an attack she selects which memory
pages will be tracked. However, in our research we are not
only interested in determining if libgcrypt is vulnerable
to OTA, but analyzing how the leakage behaves considering
every memory page combination. Therefore, as the number
of combinations is equal to 2num_pages−1 we decided to use
the limited trace recording to reduce analysis time.
We estimated the pm f (L) for every memory page combi-
nation, 131071 in total. This allows collecting some statistics
about OTA performance considering Figure 1 metrics and
more importantly it allows pinpointing where leakages origi-
nate. Table 1 shows OTA security evaluation for all page com-
binations in libgcrypt according to the metrics presented in
Section 3.
Table 1: OTA security for libgcrypt 217−1 page combs.
Attack Ideal Easy Hard Safe
PageTracer 0 87% 3% 10%
CopyCat 50% 48% 0.8% 0.8%
In addition to the number of combinations that could be
used to perform an OTA attack, it is interesting to examine
details of the different combination pmfs. Table 2 shows addi-
tional results derived from our previous experiment.
Table 2: Combination details for libgcrypt.
Insecure Min card Max bias Root combs/size
PageTracer 87% 2 50% 23/2
CopyCat 98% 7 30% 6/1
Among the interesting evaluation data is the minimum car-
dinality that could lead to a successful OTA and the maximum
bias observed. For instance, regarding PageTracer, at least
one insecure page combination exists with only two outcomes
in its pm f (L) (cardinality = 2). At the same time, the maxi-
mum bias observed among all combinations is 50%, therefore
there is at least one combination with a two-cardinality L and
equiprobable pm f labeled as insecure. Section 6.2 shows the
feasibility of attacking this kind of pmf in a practical attack.
The last row of Table 2 provides information on the number
of root page combinations and their size, i.e. number of pages
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in them. We define a combination C as root if no smaller com-
bination exists that is a subset of C. For instance, if C0 = (P1),
C1 = (P1,P2) and C2 = (P1,P2,P3) are insecure page combi-
nations, then C0 is a root combination while C1 and C2 are
not. Similarly, if in this example, no single page combination
were insecure, then C1 would become a root one. Root com-
binations can be used to pinpoint where the leakage comes
from, especially when they are single-paged ones like in the
CopyCat case.
PageTracer has 23 root combinations, all with two pages
on them; while CopyCat has six single-page ones. Therefore,
it could be possible to perform a successful OTA using only
two pages for PageTracer and a single one for CopyCat,
instead of using all 17 pages involved in our libgcrypt tem-
plate implementation. According to root definition, all page
combinations are composed by mixing the root-ones. There-
fore, in addition to knowing the smaller combinations that
could be used to succeed, it is also interesting to know how
many an attacker would need to achieve the maximum cardi-
nality3.
Figure 2 shows how the cardinality progresses when in-
creasing the number of used memory pages from one to four.
Insecure combinations are found starting from two pages
and reaching the maximum cardinality (889 in our experi-
ments) with four pages. The results for CopyCat are even
better, achieving an ideal attack scenario with only two pages.
Therefore, if an adversary wishes to reduce the number of
pages to track, e.g. for noise mitigation or error correction,
both attacks achieved their maximum cardinality even with a
reduced set of pages.
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Figure 2: libgcrypt cardinality Vs combination size (par-
tial).
3Here cardinality is used as attack performance, considering that all com-
binations labeled as insecure have an easy bias, see Section 5.1.
5.4 mbedTLS template implementation
We analyzed mbedTLS v2.16.3 in the context of the elliptic
curve secp256r1. Elliptic curve computations for this curve
use Jacobian projective coordinates. Algorithm 3 shows a
simplified version of the scalar multiplication algorithm in
this library. It follows a comb approach based on the proposal
in [22]. This algorithm randomizes the starting value of R:
during the attack section we expand on how this affects OTA,
concluding that it can be ignored for our analysis.
Algorithm 3: mbedTLS comb scalar multiplication
Input: Integer k and elliptic curve point G
Output: kG
1 K = Encode(k)
2 P = Precompute(G)
3 R = Select(K0,P)
4 for Ki ∈ K : i = [1,n] do
5 R = 2R
6 T = Select(Ki,P)
7 R = R+T
8 return R
This algorithm encodes the scalar k into a set of Ki, where
the detailed encoding is not relevant because it is invertible.
Thus, if an adversary recovers all Ki she immediately gets k.
The second step precomputes an array P composed by
multiples of G. For the targeted curve this array contains 32
points. At each iteration one point of this array is employed
based on Ki, thus identifying which point is selected at each
iteration will reveal Ki.
Regarding the state in this implementation, we will employ
R as state. Note that the state initializes at line 3 to an unknown
value based on K0. However the attacker knows that R ∈ P
therefore, there are only 32 candidates, hence, the attack can
start by considering all of them.
To demonstrate the flexibility of OTA, for this implemen-
tation we selected a Process operation composed of only
the point doubling operation, ignoring the leakage produced
by the point addition. This operation is implemented in func-
tion ecp_double_jac. In contrast to the libgcrypt case,
this function is not an exported symbol, therefore building a
template implementation to reach it requires additional effort.
The first strategy we explored was building our own copy of
mbedTLS where this symbol is actually exported, hoping that
the symbol table does not change too much wrt an original
(attack) build. We analyzed both library binaries and the dif-
ferences were not significant at 4 KB granularity, therefore
we proceeded with this option.
Following OTA implementation evaluation metrics shown
in Figure 1, we used TracerGrind to assess the determinism
of ecp_double_jac using 1000 different points and 10 trials
per point; concluding that this implementation is likely to be
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deterministic regarding PageTracer and CopyCat. The exe-
cution of ecp_double_jac was distributed among 14 mem-
ory pages, meaning 16383 page combinations that could be
used to mount an attack.
Similarly to libgcrypt analysis, we estimated the pm f (L)
for each of these combinations, summarizing results in Ta-
ble 3. Regarding CopyCat all combinations are insecure,
with PageTracer close behind. Moreover, the number of
total ideal attacker combinations is very high for both
PageTracer and CopyCat. The maximum bias found is 62%
for PageTracer, however it is still considered insecure based
on our estimations.
Table 3: Combination details for mbedTLS.
Ideal Insecure Min card Max bias Root combs/size
PageTracer 84% 99% 2 62% 63/2
CopyCat 99% 100% 9 24% 14/1
The number of root combinations increase significantly
in comparison to libgcrypt. Centering the analysis on
CopyCat results, it is worth highlighting that the number of
single-sized root combinations is equal to the number of mem-
ory pages executed by ecp_double_jac, therefore any page
in this set can be used to distinguish the processed point.
Figure 3 shows the cardinality progression on combination
size. The ideal scenario is achieved using CopyCat for almost
every two-page combinations, whereas PageTracer requires
at least three pages to achieve ideal. Both results demonstrate
the threat this library faces, especially considering the high
number of small size combinations that achieve the ideal
scenario.
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Figure 3: mbedTLS cardinality Vs combination size (partial).
5.5 wolfSSL template implementation
We analyzed wolfSSL v4.4.0 with default build options which
includes a timing resistant implementation. Our analysis fo-
cuses on the elliptic curve secp256r1, where the library uses
a Montgomery ladder to compute scalar multiplication (Al-
gorithm 4). The state in this library consists of two elliptic
curve points R and S, initialized to G and 2G respectively.
The Montgomery ladder aims at providing side-channel re-
sistance against trivial attacks by executing a point addition
and a doubling at each iteration regardless of the ith-bit of k.
However, the arguments for these operations (i.e. the state) do
depend on ki.
Algorithm 4: Montgomery ladder scalar mult.
Input: Integers k and elliptic curve point G
Output: P = kG
1 R = G
2 S = 2G
3 for i = blog2(k)c−1 downto 0 do
4 if ki = 0 then
5 S = R+S
6 R = 2R
7 else
8 R = R+S
9 S = 2S
10 return R
For this implementation we selected the doubling opera-
tion as our targeted Process which is implemented in func-
tion ecc_projective_dbl_point, not exported by default.
However the attacker can build its own version of the library
where this symbol is exported, similar to mbedTLS. Using
TracerGrind we captured some traces for this function and
observed only seven memory pages were executed, therefore
the number of page combinations is only 127, which is a con-
siderable reduction wrt to the thousands of libgcrypt and
mbedTLS.
Similar to the previous cases we estimated the determinism
of this Process implementation concluding that it has deter-
ministic leakage for both PageTracer and CopyCat. Follow-
ing the evaluation flow, we estimated each pm f (L) for each
page combination. Table 4 shows the results, highlighting that
almost every page combination is insecure using CopyCat,
while PageTracer also reported a high number of them.
For PageTracer the maximum observed bias was 52%
with a minimum cardinality of two, therefore all three an-
alyzed libraries have this two-outcome equiprobable inse-
cure pm f . A closer inspection of this leakage revealed it is
produced by a modular division by two which executes an
addition before dividing if an intermediate value is odd4.
Figure 4 shows how the cardinality progresses with the
combination size for wolfSSL. It shows reaching an ideal
scenario for two-size page combinations for CopyCat, while
4https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/blob/v4.4.0-stable/
wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c#L2179
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Table 4: Combination details for wolfSSL.
Ideal Insecure Min card Max bias Root combs/size
PageTracer 0 69% 2 52% 7/2
CopyCat 47% 94% 7 24% 4/1
three pages are required to achieved the maximum cardinality
in PageTracer.
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Figure 4: wolfSSL cardinality Vs combination size.
These results show that even when wolfSSL employs only
seven pages in our targeted Process, OTA is possible for
many page combinations. During the responsible disclosure
to wolfSSL team, they requested that we test an alternative
point doubling and associated bignum implementation, which
is known in wolfSSL terminology as Single Precision
(SP). For said build setting we repeated the experiments ob-
serving that all page combinations pmf have a cardinality
of one, therefore they are safe regarding PageTracer and
CopyCat. wolfSSL designed this alternative implementation
taking side-channels into account, developing the code to
execute without address-based leakages.
6 Real-world attacks
In this section we develop end-to-end attacks on libgcrypt,
mbedTLS, and wolfSSL scalar multiplication algorithms using
the template implementations described in Section 5. All three
attacked libraries share the experiment setup and basic OTA
approach.
Experiments setup: For validating OTA on the three ana-
lyzed libraries we employed the same experiment setup for
capturing the traces. It consists of a desktop workstation run-
ning Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS on an SGX-capable Intel i7-7700
CPU. We used Graphene-SGX framework to port each tar-
geted library to SGX without modifying them [44]. We devel-
oped PageTracer based attacks using SGX-Step framework
[45]. Usually PageTracer attack requires the adversary to se-
lect in advance which page to track based on a known leakage
model. However, regarding OTA the pm f analysis performed
for each library allows us to select an insecure one with no
knowledge of what is actually executed on those pages. For
all experiments, we compiled the targeted libraries using the
default build options.
Attack implementation: We implemented OTA as described
in Section 2 using depth-first search with an early exit when
recovering the targeted scalar. The exit condition varies be-
tween library and attack direction. We followed a state-based
attack described in Section 3.2, therefore the attacker must
compute the state processed based on a guess about Ki as
explained in Section 3.2. The attack code is independent of
the attacked pm f , therefore we made no optimizations in this
regard.
For each library, we selected a pm f and configured
SGX-Step to track its corresponding page combination. After
capturing the trace, the attacker code locates the start of the
scalar multiplication algorithm and then separates its trace
in iterations T = {I1, I2, . . , In}, where each Ii corresponds to
the Process operation of the implementation. Starting there,
the OTA procedure follows: we give specific details regard-
ing state computation and details on the scalar multiplication
algorithm in the corresponding sections.
6.1 End-to-end attack on libgcrypt
For an end-to-end attack we followed the signature genera-
tion scenario using EdDSA with Curve25519 twist curve
(i.e. Ed25519). Generating a signature using Ed25519 in-
volves computing a random nonce r of 512 bits and computing
the scalar multiplication rG where G is the group generator
point. If an adversary knows r she can forge signatures for
any message, therefore, r must remain secret [6].
This cryptosystem was designed to avoid e.g. lattice crypt-
analysis [23] where small information disclosures on r break
the scheme. For inner details about this cryptosystem and
how r is generated we refer the reader to [6]. Regarding this
research we aim at recovering all 512 bits of r, sufficient to
forge signatures, therefore further details are not relevant.
We deliberately selected a page combination with a low
pm f cardinality to demonstrate a practical attack in this set-
ting. For this task, we selected a page combination with a
pm f of 48 observed outcomes after 1000 samples.
We selected the page combination consisting of the fol-
lowing offsets: 0xd5000, 0xd6000, 0xd7000, 0xd8000. Ad-
ditionally we used offset 0xa3000 to detect when signature
generation starts, but no code in this page is executed during
scalar multiplication, hence, it does not affect the pm f .
Figure 5 shows the pm f for this page combination. Accord-
ing to this figure, this pm f is not equiprobable, with a clear
separation between about the half of the observed leakage
traces.
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Figure 5: libgcrypt attack pm f .
Forward attack: Following libgcrypt scalar multiplica-
tion implementation (Algorithm 2), the adversary must detect
which point Ri was processed at each iteration, knowing that
it is initialized to R1 = O. This algorithm scans the binary
representation of the scalar (i.e. Ki), starting from the most
significant bit that is always set. Therefore, at the start of the
second iteration, R2 = 2R1 +G = G, and this is the input to
the double-and-add-based Process.
According to Algorithm 2, R is updated at each iteration
using (2), therefore the input of the Process operation at
iteration i, Ri, depends on Ki−1.
Ri = 2Ri−1+G ·Ki−1 (2)
Thus, R3 = 3G if K2 is set and R3 = 2G otherwise. Here is
where OTA enters into play by generating template traces for
each possible value of R3. Then eliminating the one that does
not match with the observations in the target trace iteration
(i.e. I3). Therefore each Ii can be used to reveal Ki−1, hence
the last Ki will remain unknown to an OTA attacker as there
is no Ii related to it. However, there are only two possibilities,
thus, for libgcrypt implementation, OTA will reveal all bits
of the scalar except the least significant one, which is trivial
to assess using public signature information.
We captured 100 libgcrypt traces corresponding to the
generation of Ed25519 signatures. Using our template imple-
mentation based on TracerGrind we launched OTA on them
using the page combination described below, recovering the
processed Ed22519 nonce for each signature on all of them.
The average number of calls to the template implementation
was 1038, therefore the attack is very feasible in practice.
Backward attack: This attack assumes the adversary knows
the projective coordinates of the last Ri just before converting
them back to affine. This requirement can be fulfilled using
a side-channel attack on the modular inversion algorithm of
libgcrypt [4]. Therefore, the last value of R will be the
initial OTA state, thus, the adversary reverses the target trace
order, such that the first iteration processed by OTA will be
the last one executed by the algorithm.
In this case the attacker will known the state resulting
from the Process execution, that is, she will known Ri in (2).
Therefore the first step is to compute Process input, i.e. Ri−1
for all possible Ki−1. This can be done using (3).
Ri−1 = (Ri−G ·Ki−1)/2 (3)
Indeed (3) implies computing modular roots [6, 34], there-
fore, for a single pair Ri,Ki−1 multiple Ri−1 candidates could
be obtained. This implies more template traces must be cap-
tured wrt the forward case.
Using this approach it was possible to recover the scalars
processed in all 100 traces. In this case the average number of
calls to the template implementation was 2851. This validates
our augmented projective coordinates attack. Note that the
original projective coordinates attack of Naccache et al. [34]
only recovers a few bits of the scalar, therefore said attack
does not apply to EdDSA, on the other hand the proposed
augmented version can be used to break this cryptosystem.
6.2 End-to-end attack on mbedTLS
mbedTLS scalar multiplication has an OTA countermeasure
in place: it randomizes the starting coordinates of R just after
line 3. However, there are at least two scenarios where OTA
can be applied.
Said point randomization is only executed before the scalar
multiplication, therefore it offers protection against a forward
OTA, but backward approach is still a threat. Additionally,
said countermeasure only works if a mbedTLS randomiza-
tion object is passed as argument to this function. Regarding
ECDSA this randomization takes places as expected, however,
we have found two scenarios were it does not, leaving the door
open to a forward OTA. This situation occurs when an elliptic
curve private key is loaded in this library without the public
key or if it compressed. In these scenarios, the public key is
computed on the fly without initializing the randomization
object.
Therefore the backward case can be useful to break proto-
cols like ECDSA or ECDH, while the forward case when a
private key with missing or compressed public key is loaded
by the library. Accordingly, we focus our attention on the
scalar multiplication primitive in this library, negating said
countermeasure.
The attack procedure is very similar to libgcrypt descrip-
tion in Section 6.1. In this case, the scalar has 256 bits and at
each iteration out of 52 the adversary must guess 32 possible
Ki, due to the windowed feature of the scalar multiplication.
We employed the page combination: 0x2f000, 0xf000,
0x10000, 0x36000 that has an ideal pm f . We used auxil-
iary page offsets 0x30000 and 0x31000 to detect the start
of scalar multiplication routine and the Process operation
13
(i.e. ecp_double_jac function). However, no code is exe-
cuted on these pages during a call to ecp_double_jac, there-
fore they have no effect on the attack.
We captured 100 traces using PageTracer against an
SGX enclave running the scalar multiplication for curve
secp256r1. We attempted to recover the scalar using OTA
in both the forward and backward directions. In the forward
case it was possible to recover all Ki except the last one as
no Process is executed after it is selected. However, there
are only 32 of them, thus feasible to enumerate. Note that
if we alternatively included the addition operation as part of
Process it could be obtained by OTA directly.
The forward attack succeeded for all traces while the num-
ber of calls to template implementation was 1664 per attack
(i.e. 32 templates for 52 iterations). This is due to the ideal
pm f employed acting as a perfect state distinguisher.
The backward attack instances also succeed for all traces,
with an average number of calls to the template implemen-
tation of 1959. The number varies between different attacks
due to the modular roots involved generating additional candi-
dates per each guessed Ki (see Section 6.1 for details). For this
attack we enabled the projective coordinates randomization
of the starting state to demonstrate that it is useless against a
backward OTA.
A differentiating characteristic wrt to libgcrypt case is
that the attacked implementation executed an unmodified
mbedTLS library, while the template one uses a patched one
where ecp_double_jac was an exported symbol.
6.3 End-to-end attack on wolfSSL
For demonstrating the feasibility of OTA using PageTracer
on wolfSSL, We captured 100 traces corresponding to an Intel
SGX enclave computing scalar multiplications.
We employed the page combination consisting of
the offsets: 0x25000, 0x29000, 0x2a000, 0x4b000. We
additionally used 0x2c000 to detect the start of the
scalar multiplication routine, but it is not executed during
ecc_projective_dbl_point. This page combination has
an ideal pm f .
In this case we only executed a forward OTA resulting in
full recovery on all traces requiring 512 calls to the template
implementation in all cases. Note, that an ideal pmf and a
binary scalar multiplication algorithm like the Montgomery
ladder allow to reduce this number to only 256 (i.e. one call
per bit), however as commented before our algorithm does
not consider the page pm f .
In addition to the previous pm f we attacked this imple-
mentation using other approaches. The first is considering
a two-cardinality equiprobable pm f . We executed this at-
tack for three traces, recovering the full scalar on all of them.
Naturally, the number of calls to the template implementa-
tion increases, and also the number of solution tests. The
pairs for these values for the three instances were: (5780,10),
(19454,76), and (30640,177), all practical attacks.
The second approach follows the scalar-based OTA the-
oretically presented in Section 3.2. Instead of guessing the
state, this approach assumes the adversary has access to a tem-
plate implementation where the input scalar can be chosen.
For this scenario we used the same ideal page combination
employed before, and 100 traces: recovering the full scalars
in all of them.
7 Conclusion
Previous works on OTA only considered part of its potential:
in this paper we revisited that description proposing a frame-
work and evaluation metrics to detect if an implementation is
vulnerable to OTA.
Additionally, we demonstrated that OTA can also work in
the backward direction, a case not considered before. In this
regard a backward OTA can be viewed as an augmented pro-
jective coordinate attack because it can recover the whole
scalar using a single trace, in comparison to the thousands
needed by the original projective coordinates attack of Nac-
cache et al. [34].
The three analyzed libraries libgcrypt, mbedTLS, and
wolfSSL have many leaky points that can be exploited using
OTA. We demonstrated practical attacks for the three libraries,
recovering the full scalar employing a single trace using a
microarchitecture side-channel after extensive experiments in
all cases.
In the microarchitecture realm it is possible to have an ideal
attacker scenario as demonstrated for the analyzed libraries.
At the same time it is also possible to achieve safe ones if the
implementation follows a constant-address approach. These
scenarios are not common at all in the power-consumption
case where original OTA was proposed.
The tool proposed to detect OTA vulnerabilities is not ex-
haustive, therefore there could be additional exploitable paths.
At the same time, its idea serves as a starting point to develop
a leakage assessment tool for address-based side-channels
that is able to detect any OTA vulnerability in the hierarchy
of an elliptic curve implementation.
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